Mailing List Archive

[PATCH 03/19] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap
The xsm_iomem_permission and xsm_ioport_permission hooks are intended to
be called by the domain builder, while the calls in arch/x86/domctl.c
which control mapping are also performed by the device model. Because of
this, they should not use the same XSM hooks.

This also adds a missing XSM hook in the unbind IRQ domctl.

Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 8 ++++++--
xen/arch/x86/physdev.c | 2 +-
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 508c77c..7069d7a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -803,6 +803,10 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
!irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
goto unbind_out;

+ ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(d, bind);
+ if ( ret )
+ goto unbind_out;
+
if ( iommu_enabled )
{
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
@@ -842,7 +846,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) )
break;

- ret = xsm_iomem_permission(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add);
+ ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add);
if ( ret ) {
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
break;
@@ -929,7 +933,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domctl->domain)) == NULL) )
break;

- ret = xsm_ioport_permission(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
+ ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
if ( ret ) {
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
index 751cbd4..2928f1c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int physdev_unmap_pirq(domid_t domid, int pirq)
if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
goto free_domain;

- ret = xsm_irq_permission(d, domain_pirq_to_irq(d, pirq), 0);
+ ret = xsm_unmap_domain_pirq(d, domain_pirq_to_irq(d, pirq));
if ( ret )
goto free_domain;

diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index a949c1e..2560229 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ struct xsm_operations {

char *(*show_irq_sid) (int irq);
int (*map_domain_pirq) (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data);
+ int (*unmap_domain_pirq) (struct domain *d, int irq);
int (*irq_permission) (struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow);
int (*iomem_permission) (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow);
+ int (*iomem_mapping) (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow);
int (*pci_config_permission) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);

int (*get_device_group) (uint32_t machine_bdf);
@@ -176,11 +178,12 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*add_to_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2);
int (*sendtrigger) (struct domain *d);
int (*bind_pt_irq) (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind);
- int (*unbind_pt_irq) (struct domain *d);
+ int (*unbind_pt_irq) (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind);
int (*pin_mem_cacheattr) (struct domain *d);
int (*ext_vcpucontext) (struct domain *d, uint32_t cmd);
int (*vcpuextstate) (struct domain *d, uint32_t cmd);
int (*ioport_permission) (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow);
+ int (*ioport_mapping) (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow);
#endif
};

@@ -495,6 +498,11 @@ static inline int xsm_map_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data)
return xsm_call(map_domain_pirq(d, irq, data));
}

+static inline int xsm_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
+{
+ return xsm_call(unmap_domain_pirq(d, irq));
+}
+
static inline int xsm_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
{
return xsm_call(irq_permission(d, pirq, allow));
@@ -505,6 +513,11 @@ static inline int xsm_iomem_permission (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e
return xsm_call(iomem_permission(d, s, e, allow));
}

+static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+{
+ return xsm_call(iomem_mapping(d, s, e, allow));
+}
+
static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
{
return xsm_call(pci_config_permission(d, machine_bdf, start, end, access));
@@ -781,9 +794,10 @@ static inline int xsm_bind_pt_irq(struct domain *d,
return xsm_call(bind_pt_irq(d, bind));
}

-static inline int xsm_unbind_pt_irq(struct domain *d)
+static inline int xsm_unbind_pt_irq(struct domain *d,
+ struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
{
- return xsm_call(unbind_pt_irq(d));
+ return xsm_call(unbind_pt_irq(d, bind));
}

static inline int xsm_pin_mem_cacheattr(struct domain *d)
@@ -804,6 +818,11 @@ static inline int xsm_ioport_permission (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t
{
return xsm_call(ioport_permission(d, s, e, allow));
}
+
+static inline int xsm_ioport_mapping (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+{
+ return xsm_call(ioport_mapping(d, s, e, allow));
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86 */

extern struct xsm_operations dummy_xsm_ops;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index b726eaf..5f078d2 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int dummy_map_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data)
return 0;
}

+static int dummy_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
{
return 0;
@@ -405,6 +410,11 @@ static int dummy_iomem_permission (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uin
return 0;
}

+static int dummy_iomem_mapping (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_pci_config_permission (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf,
uint16_t start, uint16_t end,
uint8_t access)
@@ -585,7 +595,7 @@ static int dummy_bind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *b
return 0;
}

-static int dummy_unbind_pt_irq (struct domain *d)
+static int dummy_unbind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -609,6 +619,11 @@ static int dummy_ioport_permission (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, ui
{
return 0;
}
+
+static int dummy_ioport_mapping (struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif

struct xsm_operations dummy_xsm_ops;
@@ -693,8 +708,10 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)

set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, show_irq_sid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, map_domain_pirq);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unmap_domain_pirq);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, irq_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, iomem_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, iomem_mapping);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, pci_config_permission);

set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_device_group);
@@ -757,5 +774,6 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ext_vcpucontext);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, vcpuextstate);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ioport_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ioport_mapping);
#endif
}
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 0ca10d0..d4635d0 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -721,43 +721,40 @@ static int flask_map_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data)
return rc;
}

-static int flask_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int irq, uint8_t access)
+static int flask_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
{
- u32 perm;
- u32 rsid;
+ u32 sid;
int rc = -EPERM;

- struct domain_security_struct *ssec, *tsec;
+ struct domain_security_struct *ssec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;

- rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
- resource_to_perm(access));
-
+ rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
if ( rc )
return rc;

- if ( access )
- perm = RESOURCE__ADD_IRQ;
- else
- perm = RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ;
-
ssec = current->domain->ssid;
- tsec = d->ssid;

- rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &rsid, &ad);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, perm, &ad);
+ if ( irq >= nr_irqs_gsi ) {
+ /* TODO support for MSI here */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &sid, &ad);
+ }
if ( rc )
return rc;

- if ( access )
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
- RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ, &ad);
return rc;
}

+static int flask_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t access)
+{
+ /* the PIRQ number is not useful; real IRQ is checked during mapping */
+ return domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
+ resource_to_perm(access));
+}
+
struct iomem_has_perm_data {
struct domain_security_struct *ssec, *tsec;
u32 perm;
@@ -1413,7 +1410,7 @@ static int flask_bind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *b
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
}

-static int flask_unbind_pt_irq (struct domain *d)
+static int flask_unbind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
{
return domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
}
@@ -1533,6 +1530,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.show_irq_sid = flask_show_irq_sid,

.map_domain_pirq = flask_map_domain_pirq,
+ .unmap_domain_pirq = flask_unmap_domain_pirq,
.irq_permission = flask_irq_permission,
.iomem_permission = flask_iomem_permission,
.pci_config_permission = flask_pci_config_permission,
--
1.7.11.7


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Re: [PATCH 03/19] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap [ In reply to ]
>>> On 16.11.12 at 19:28, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> -static int flask_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int irq, uint8_t access)
> +static int flask_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
> {
> - u32 perm;
> - u32 rsid;
> + u32 sid;
> int rc = -EPERM;
>
> - struct domain_security_struct *ssec, *tsec;
> + struct domain_security_struct *ssec;
> struct avc_audit_data ad;
>
> - rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
> - resource_to_perm(access));
> -
> + rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
> if ( rc )
> return rc;
>
> - if ( access )
> - perm = RESOURCE__ADD_IRQ;
> - else
> - perm = RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ;
> -
> ssec = current->domain->ssid;
> - tsec = d->ssid;
>
> - rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &rsid, &ad);
> - if ( rc )
> - return rc;
> -
> - rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, perm, &ad);
> + if ( irq >= nr_irqs_gsi ) {

Isn't the use of nr_irqs_gsi x86-specific?

Jan

> + /* TODO support for MSI here */
> + return 0;
> + } else {
> + rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &sid, &ad);
> + }
> if ( rc )
> return rc;
>
> - if ( access )
> - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
> - RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
> + rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ, &ad);
> return rc;
> }



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Re: [PATCH 03/19] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap [ In reply to ]
On 11/19/2012 03:59 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 16.11.12 at 19:28, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>> -static int flask_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int irq, uint8_t access)
>> +static int flask_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
>> {
>> - u32 perm;
>> - u32 rsid;
>> + u32 sid;
>> int rc = -EPERM;
>>
>> - struct domain_security_struct *ssec, *tsec;
>> + struct domain_security_struct *ssec;
>> struct avc_audit_data ad;
>>
>> - rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
>> - resource_to_perm(access));
>> -
>> + rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
>> if ( rc )
>> return rc;
>>
>> - if ( access )
>> - perm = RESOURCE__ADD_IRQ;
>> - else
>> - perm = RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ;
>> -
>> ssec = current->domain->ssid;
>> - tsec = d->ssid;
>>
>> - rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &rsid, &ad);
>> - if ( rc )
>> - return rc;
>> -
>> - rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, perm, &ad);
>> + if ( irq >= nr_irqs_gsi ) {
>
> Isn't the use of nr_irqs_gsi x86-specific?
>
> Jan
>

It's defined in xen/include/xen/irq.h (not in an x86-specific file), so I
hadn't assumed so. The check here is to avoid needing to allow access to
the MSI IRQs by number since they are dynamic and therefore meaningless in
a statically-defined policy.

>> + /* TODO support for MSI here */
>> + return 0;
>> + } else {
>> + rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &sid, &ad);
>> + }
>> if ( rc )
>> return rc;
>>
>> - if ( access )
>> - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
>> - RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
>> + rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ, &ad);
>> return rc;
>> }
>
>
>


--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

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Re: [PATCH 03/19] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap [ In reply to ]
>>> On 19.11.12 at 15:53, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On 11/19/2012 03:59 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.11.12 at 19:28, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>>> -static int flask_irq_permission (struct domain *d, int irq, uint8_t access)
>>> +static int flask_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d, int irq)
>>> {
>>> - u32 perm;
>>> - u32 rsid;
>>> + u32 sid;
>>> int rc = -EPERM;
>>>
>>> - struct domain_security_struct *ssec, *tsec;
>>> + struct domain_security_struct *ssec;
>>> struct avc_audit_data ad;
>>>
>>> - rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
>>> - resource_to_perm(access));
>>> -
>>> + rc = domain_has_perm(current->domain, d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE,
> RESOURCE__REMOVE);
>>> if ( rc )
>>> return rc;
>>>
>>> - if ( access )
>>> - perm = RESOURCE__ADD_IRQ;
>>> - else
>>> - perm = RESOURCE__REMOVE_IRQ;
>>> -
>>> ssec = current->domain->ssid;
>>> - tsec = d->ssid;
>>>
>>> - rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &rsid, &ad);
>>> - if ( rc )
>>> - return rc;
>>> -
>>> - rc = avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, perm, &ad);
>>> + if ( irq >= nr_irqs_gsi ) {
>>
>> Isn't the use of nr_irqs_gsi x86-specific?
>
> It's defined in xen/include/xen/irq.h (not in an x86-specific file), so I
> hadn't assumed so. The check here is to avoid needing to allow access to
> the MSI IRQs by number since they are dynamic and therefore meaningless in
> a statically-defined policy.

Indeed, there are other uses in common code. We may need to
do something about this for ARM.

Jan


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