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Re: Motion for a new POST NSF AUP [ In reply to ]
For my two cents:

I also agree with John. I think the current system where 'civic-saviors'
protest spams to the spammers' provider works fairly well. It works as a
pressure to resist spamming. The only thing I don't like about it are the
militant-son-of-spams. If the current unstructured system stays, I think
there should be a simple addition to govern son-of-spammers to prevent the
kind of frontier justice used on those lawyers. I myself will usually
forward the complaint on to the spammers. After 2 complaints I add that
they need to stop the activity, but sometimes it's simply a lag-time or
long time-to-live on a spam that keeps complaints coming in long
afterward. ...

---------------- Brian Curnow --------------

On Sun, 15 Oct 1995, Tim Bass wrote:

>
> John Curran and I are in total agreement on John's premise that any
> Post NSF AUP is either a) unenforceable or b) subject to abuse. I suggest
> that for the moment, that we agree with John that any AUP is both:
>
> a) Unenforceable;
> b) Subject to abuse; and
> c) Virtually impossible to authenticate.
>
> Giving the above, the question still remains and the original motion is still
> valid for this reason.
>
> If we define a Post NSF AUP, then at least everyone who uses the Internet
> will have had the opportunity to have read and understood what the current
> Internet AUP describes.
>
> It is possible that having a clearly defined AUP will not stop spam and
> other unacceptable uses of the net, and clearly an AUP is not enforceable
> ( and for IP security reasons should not be enforced without absolute
> authentication as John correctly points out).
>
> On the other hand, having a clearly defined AUP may discourage potential
> spammers and child pornographers, etc. (not that we consider spammers
> and child pornography peddlers in the same vein..). Also, having a
> clearly defined Internet AUP will send a signal to the news media and
> government officials that the providers of Internet services are
> capable of formulating policy in an area that, without self-regulation,
> has a strong potential to continue degenerating.
>
> Is a self-formulated Post NSF AUP, without enforcement, still a good idea?
>
> The answer, I suggest, is not obvious, but a debate on the subject
> does have considerable merit, given the events of the past week or so.
>
>
> Tim
>
>
>
>
> --
> +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
> | Tim Bass | #include<campfire.h> |
> | Principal Network Systems Engineer | for(beer=100;beer>1;beer++){ |
> | The Silk Road Group, Ltd. | take_one_down(); |
> | | pass_it_around(); |
> | http://www.silkroad.com/ | } |
> | | back_to_work(); /*never reached */ |
> +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
>
Re: Motion for a new POST NSF AUP [ In reply to ]
Rick -

1) Yup, I agree with you that some smarter spammers may try to circumvent
whatever measures are implemented, but

2) Machines could automatically implement some rules before exploding,
forwarding, etc. and reduce the "subscribe me" and flagrant spamming.
Messages to the uninitiated culprits would as a side effect help to educate.

3) Some good would come from the existence of #2.

Bill
> > I personally think slightly smarter exploders might go a long way. For
> > example:
> > ...
> > 2) an exploder that "suspends" messages with more than, say 6 lists
> > and newsgroups, and notifies the sender. If the sender is not a real
> > address, it automatically is purged.
>
> But wouldn't a spammer just defeat this measure by using a shell script, say.
> Instead of sending one message to n lists, a script could easily send n
> messages each addressed to a single list.
>
> Rick Boivie
> rboivie@vnet.ibm.com
>
Re: Motion for a new POST NSF AUP [ In reply to ]
At 10:56 AM 10/16/95 +0100, Havard.Eidnes@runit.sintef.no wrote:
>> Another suggestion was that SMTP headers always contain the
>> IP address. I've seen this in quite a few mailers already.
>> All we need is a slight modification to the SMTP Receipt
>> standard. This could be a Best Current Practice, quickly
>> published!
>
>Hm, this is already covered. RFC 1123 says:
>
> 5.2.8 DATA Command: RFC-821 Section 4.1.1
>...
> * The FROM field SHOULD contain both (1) the name of the
> source host as presented in the HELO command and (2) a
> domain literal containing the IP address of the source,
> determined from the TCP connection.

Big deal. Since it is only SHOULD many mailers, like CDC's MAIL*Hub profess
not to support it, as it is not a MUST...

Robert Moskowitz
Chrysler Corporation
(810) 758-8212

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