Mailing List Archive

Announce: OpenSSH 7.3 released
OpenSSH 7.3 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in a near-future
release, specifically:

* Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
is 768 bits)
* Removing server-side support for the SSH v.1 protocol (currently
compile-time disabled).
* In approximately 1 year, removing all support for the SSH v.1
protocol (currently compile-time disabled).

This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for future releases.

Changes since OpenSSH 7.2
=========================

This is primarily a bugfix release.

Security
--------

* sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack against
the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An attacker could
send very long passwords that would cause excessive CPU use in
crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept password authentication
requests of length greater than 1024 characters. Independently
reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle), Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.

* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password authentication
that could be used to discern valid from invalid account names
when long passwords were sent and particular password hashing
algorithms are in use on the server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by
EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC padding
oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny
Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers
are disabled by default and only included for legacy compatibility.

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC verification for
Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC algorithms to verify the
MAC before decrypting any ciphertext. This removes the possibility
of timing differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no
such leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.

* sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
found by Shayan Sadigh.

New Features
------------

* ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J command-line
flag to allow simplified indirection through a one or more SSH
bastions or "jump hosts".

* ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying specific
agent sockets instead of accepting one from the environment.

* ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be
optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal mode as
per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman
2K, 4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.

* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
signatures in certificates;

* ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.

* ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent
from the server. bz#2058

Bugfixes
--------

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common
protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585

* sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and
accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not
requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398

* sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match. bz#2585

* ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988

* misc: Make PROTOCOL description for direct-streamlocal@openssh.com
channel open messages match deployed code. bz#2529

* ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix
failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562

* sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file
that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.

* sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts; bz#2554

* ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an agent
without corresponding private keys on the filesystem. bz#2550

* sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not being
sent. bz#2252

Portability
-----------

* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix compilation by automatically disabling ciphers
not supported by OpenSSL. bz#2466

* misc: Fix compilation failures on some versions of AIX's compiler
related to the definition of the VA_COPY macro. bz#2589

* sshd(8): Whitelist more architectures to enable the seccomp-bpf
sandbox. bz#2590

* ssh-agent(1), sftp-server(8): Disable process tracing on Solaris
using setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). bz#2584

* sshd(8): On Solaris, don't call Solaris setproject() with
UsePAM=yes it's PAM's responsibility. bz#2425

Checksums:
==========

- SHA1 (openssh-7.3.tar.gz) = b1641e5265d9ec68a9a19decc3a7edd1203cbd33
- SHA256 (openssh-7.3.tar.gz) = vS0X35qrX9OOPBkyDMYhOje/DBwHBVEV7nv5rkzw4vM=

- SHA1 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = bfade84283fcba885e2084343ab19a08c7d123a5
- SHA256 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = P/uYmm3KppWUw7VQ1IVaWi4XGMzd5/XjY4e0JCIPvsw=

Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
key used to sign the releases is available as RELEASE_KEY.asc from
the mirror sites.

Reporting Bugs:
===============

- Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com

OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de
Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre,
Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.
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