Mailing List Archive

Announce: OpenSSH 7.0 released
OpenSSH 7.0 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in the next release
including:

* Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
is 768 bits)

* Several ciphers will be disabled by default: blowfish-cbc,
cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases
for AES.

* MD5-based HMAC algorithms will be disabled by default.

This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for OpenSSH 7.1 when it is released.

Changes since OpenSSH 6.9
=========================

This focus of this release is primarily to deprecate weak, legacy
and/or unsafe cryptography.

Security
--------

* sshd(8): OpenSSH 6.8 and 6.9 incorrectly set TTYs to be world-
writable. Local attackers may be able to write arbitrary messages
to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences.
Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.

* sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a privilege separation
weakness related to PAM support. Attackers who could successfully
compromise the pre-authentication process for remote code
execution and who had valid credentials on the host could
impersonate other users. Reported by Moritz Jodeit.

* sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a use-after-free bug
related to PAM support that was reachable by attackers who could
compromise the pre-authentication process for remote code
execution. Also reported by Moritz Jodeit.

* sshd(8): fix circumvention of MaxAuthTries using keyboard-
interactive authentication. By specifying a long, repeating
keyboard-interactive "devices" string, an attacker could request
the same authentication method be tried thousands of times in
a single pass. The LoginGraceTime timeout in sshd(8) and any
authentication failure delays implemented by the authentication
mechanism itself were still applied. Found by Kingcope.

Potentially-incompatible Changes
--------------------------------

* Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by
default at compile time.

* Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange
is disabled by default at run-time. It may be re-enabled using
the instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html

* Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled
by default at run-time. These may be re-enabled using the
instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html

* Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.

* The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin option has
changed from "yes" to "prohibit-password".

* PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans all
interactive authentication methods, allowing only public-key,
hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously it permitted
keyboard-interactive and password-less authentication if those
were enabled).

New Features
------------

* ssh_config(5): add PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes option to control which
public key types are available for user authentication.

* sshd_config(5): add HostKeyAlgorithms option to control which
public key types are offered for host authentications.

* ssh(1), sshd(8): extend Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgorithms,
HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedKeyTypes
options to allow appending to the default set of algorithms
instead of replacing it. Options may now be prefixed with a '+'
to append to the default, e.g. "HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-dss".

* sshd_config(5): PermitRootLogin now accepts an argument of
'prohibit-password' as a less-ambiguous synonym of 'without-
password'.

Bugfixes
--------

* ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatability workarounds for Cisco and more
PuTTY versions. bz#2424

* Fix some omissions and errors in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.mux
documentation relating to Unix domain socket forwarding;
bz#2421 bz#2422

* ssh(1): Improve the ssh(1) manual page to include a better
description of Unix domain socket forwarding; bz#2423

* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots, fixing
failures to load keys when they are present. bz#2427

* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): do not ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that wth
empty CKA_ID; bz#2429

* sshd(8): clarify documentation for UseDNS option; bz#2045

Portable OpenSSH
----------------

* Check realpath(3) behaviour matches what sftp-server requires and
use a replacement if necessary.

Checksums:
==========

- SHA1 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = a19ff0bad2a67348b1d01a38a9580236120b7099
- SHA256 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = 4F6HV/ZqT465f3sMB2vIkXO+wrYtL5hnqzAymfbZ1Jk=

- SHA1 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = d8337c9eab91d360d104f6dd805f8b32089c063c
- SHA256 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = /VkySToZ9MgRU9gS7k4EK0m707dZqz2TRKvswrwUheU=

Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was recently rotated.
The new key has been signed by the old key to provide continuity. It is
available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc.

Reporting Bugs:
===============

- Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com

OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and
Ben Lindstrom.

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