Mailing List Archive: Backup of Keys

I'd like to see it updated. I think it would be useful utility to have.

On 5/25/2020 2:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Having only heard of it just now, I was surprised it's not included in Debian,
>> until I saw the word of caution and lack of commit history.
> The word of caution is because I'm not actively maintaining it: the lack
> of commit history is because it's literally a project I threw together
> over a single long evening fueled by two beers and a Red Bull.
>
> The code isn't bad. However, in the four years since I wrote it QMake
> has changed its .pro files just barely enough that they need to be updated.
>
> If there's interest, I'll take a look at updating this for the most
> recent version of Qt.
>
>
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If someone does not want to remember a passphrase then it goes to
something they have. Either some sort of key digital or "analog" or
biometric. Granted changing that is more limited but some get
creative, 10 fingers and 10 toes to choose from.

I don't think there is any perfect system. Passwords are easy to change
but also easy to forget. Biometrics are hard to "lose" but also hard to
change.

On 5/25/2020 12:36 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 24/05/2020 21:39, Mark wrote:
>> I know there are other options maybe even some that use
>> biometrics to decrypt the database.
> I am very wary of biometrics for authentication purposes. There are so
> many examples where the vendor assured us it was working really well,
> and researchers easily cracked the system by using a photo, or
> photocopied fingerprints they lifted off a glass or even more funny from
> the fingerprint reader itself.
>
> That's for authentication, where only non-reproducability is vital. For
> encryption, it's much worse, because you need a lot of entropy for that
> to ward off offline attacks. And biometrics just doesn't have that much
> entropy.
>
> And both share that there is no recovery from compromise. If somebody
> learns your passphrase, you change it, tracking down all backups and
> changing them as well. That might be a little painful.
>
> If somebody manages to copy your biometrics, you can't change them. You
> could erase your fingerprints by taking a job processing pineapples on a
> daily basis. And you could get plastic surgery for your face, but that
> really puts the painful in "it's so painful to change your passphrase
> everywhere"...
>
> HTH,
>
> Peter.
>

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