Mailing List Archive

Hi!

The GnuPG Project is pleased to announce the availability of Libgcrypt
version 1.8.5. This release fixes an ECDSA side-channel attack.

Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks.
It is originally based on code used by GnuPG. It does not provide any
implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of
applied cryptography is required to use Libgcrypt.


Noteworthy changes in version 1.8.5
===================================

* Bug fixes:

- Add mitigation against an ECDSA timing attack.
[T4626,CVE-2019-13627]

- Improve ECDSA unblinding.

* Other features:

- Provide a pkg-config file for libgcrypt.

Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T4683


Download
========

Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed
at <https://gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html>. On the primary server
the source tarball and its digital signature are:

https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2
https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2.sig

or gzip compressed:

https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.gz
https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.gz.sig

In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you downloaded is an
original and unmodified file please follow the instructions found at
<https://gnupg.org/download/integrity_check.html>. In short, you may
use one of the following methods:

- Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the
signature of the file libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2 you would use this
command:

gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2.sig libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2

This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that
this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint
against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by
checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys.
See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys.

- If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have
to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do
this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the
file libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2, you run the command like this:

sha1sum libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2

and check that the output matches the first line from the
this list:

2d8781e92f88706707a1e76fb628b499ad538a30 libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.bz2
c4852a14b57744b2d0e97d9e8e3e60c95ef7e6bb libgcrypt-1.8.5.tar.gz

You should also verify that the checksums above are authentic by
matching them with copies of this announcement. Those copies can be
found at other mailing lists, web sites, and search engines.


Copying
=======

Libgcrypt is distributed under the terms of the GNU Lesser General
Public License (LGPLv2.1+). The helper programs as well as the
documentation are distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public
License (GPLv2+). The file LICENSES has notices about contributions
that require that these additional notices are distributed.


Support
=======

In case of build problems specific to this release please first check
https://dev.gnupg.org/T4683 for updated information.

For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included
manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. A
listing with commercial support offers for Libgcrypt and related
software is available at the GnuPG web site [2].

If you are a developer and you may need a certain feature for your
project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gcrypt-devel
mailing list for discussion.


Thanks
======

Maintenance and development of GnuPG is mostly financed by donations.
The GnuPG project currently employs two full-time developer and two
contractors. They all work exclusively on GnuPG and closely related
software like Libgcrypt, GPGME, and GPA.

We have to thank all the people who helped the GnuPG project, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists. Thanks to Tomas Mraz for pointing out several smaller flaws.

Many thanks to our numerous financial supporters, both corporate and
individuals. Without you it would not be possible to keep GnuPG in a
good shape and address all the small and larger requests made by our
users. Thanks.


Happy hacking,

Your GnuPG hackers



p.s.
This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to
the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list.

p.p.s
List of Release Signing Keys:

To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by
malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and
binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of
their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more
of these four keys:

rsa2048 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
Werner Koch (dist sig)

rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31]
Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959
David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) <dshaw 'at' jabberwocky.com>

rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2020-10-30]
Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286 A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe 'at' fsij.org>

rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15]
Key fingerprint = 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28
Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key)

The keys are available at <https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html> and
in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg .
Note that this mail has been signed by a different key.

--
Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.